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THE LEGISLATURE'S ROLE IN THE TAKING ISSUE
MITCHELL B. HAIGLER,* MARY M. MCINERNY,t
ROBERT M. RHODES1
I. INTRODUCTION
The eighteenth-century draftsmen placed in the Bill of Rights
the following twelve words: "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."' Later, Congress provided in
the fourteenth amendment that no state shall "deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ' ' 2 Analogous pro-
visions in the Florida constitution provide that "no private property
shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compensa-
tion," and guarantee that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law."4
Complementary to, but competing with, the constitutional due
process and taking clauses is the authority of government to regulate
under its police powers in the interest of the public health, safety and
welfare. Such authority is an inherent attribute of sovereignty, reserved
to the states or the people under the tenth amendment of the federal
constitution. 5 The state police powers are broad, comprehensive, and
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
3. FiA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
4. FLA. CONSr. art. I, § 9.
5. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919); Bacon
v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878); Patterson
v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501 (1878).
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have been expansively interpreted and applied by the courts. Moreover,
such powers are constantly evolving to meet changing social, economic
and political conditions.
Key among recent employment of the police power has been state
and local enactment of land use regulations, including zoning and sub-
division laws, wetlands protection, coastal construction setback lines,
and extensive governmental permitting systems for specific develop-
ment activities. Litigation involving such regulations has often drawn
together the taking clause and the police powers, requiring judicial
construction and resolution of competing private and public interests
in a particular land parcel or area.
Extension or curtailment of governmental power necessarily in-
volves the primary policy making branch of government-the legisla-
ture. Yet what type of action, if any, may a legislature constitutionally
take to establish policy relative to permissible land use restraints? Al-
though this question has been largely ignored by the courts and
journal commentators, the response to it will define and shape the
legislature's role in the taking issue, as well as provide a point of de-
parture for legislative action.
This article discusses the need for legislative clarification of the
taking issue, analyzes the nature of the legislative power to define a
taking, and explores the potential scope of judicial review of such
legislative action. Although positive legislation is urged, it is recognized
that the courts will continue to serve their traditional role as final
arbiters of the taking issue. A number of criteria that may be con-
sidered by a legislature in developing an appropriate statutory ap-
proach are also presented.
II. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
No legislature has attempted to statutorily distinguish between
land use regulations that are valid as an exercise of the police power
and those that are invalid as a taking of property without just com-
pensation. Legislatures have, however, attacked on a piecemeal basis
various elements of the problem other than the primary task of de-
claring when a "taking" is deemed to occur; a common approach is
to statutorily define key phrases of the constitutional prohibition, such
as "just compensation," "public use," 7 and "property." s Most often,
6. Rivers & Harbors Act of 1970 § 111, 33 U.S.C. § 595(a) (Supp. 1975); United States
v. 967,905 Acres of Land, More or Less, 447 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 974 (1972).
7. Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 715a-s (1970); Swan Lake Hunting
Club v. United States, 381 F.2d 238, 241 (5th Cir. 1967).
8. Under the common law a landowner's proprietary interest in the column of
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these definitions have been formulated in relation to governmental
exercise of the eminent domain power.9 As to takings occurring
through exercise of the police power, the legislatures have generally
remained silent.
This protracted silence indicates a tacit decision by legislative
bodies to accept the judiciary's resolution of a two-fold issue-deter-
mination of the permissible extent of governmentally imposed re-
straints upon land use under the taking clause, and delimitation of the
police power. Recently, however, both the executive and legislative
branches of Florida government have commenced inquiry into judicial
treatment of the taking issue. Questions have been raised in relation
to the absence of a cohesive doctrinal basis for judicial decisions, the
inconsistency in cases holding "a taking" or "not a taking," and the
need for predictive guidelines in this area of law.10
aerospace above the land extended to an unlimited height. See, e.g., 2 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 18 (1902). See also Illinois Cent. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 48 N.E. 492
(Ill. 1897); Murphy v. Bolger, 15 A. 365 (Vt. 1888). But when the need for air travel
necessitated a change in the philosophy of proprietary interest in airspace, it was by
legislative action that the change occurred.
The Uniform State Law for Aeronautics, formulated in 1922, purported to delimit
ownership of airspace in subjacent landowners by creating a right of flight over the
lands unless the flight was made "at such a low altitude as to interfere with the then
existing use" of the land, or "unless so conducted as to be imminently dangerous to
persons or property lawfully on the land or water beneath." UNIFORM AERONAUTICS Act
§ 4 (act withdrawn 1943).
In 1943, the Uniform Act was withdrawn, apparently because of federal preemption.
Congress adopted the Air Commerce Act of 1926, Act of May 20, 1926, ch. 344, § 1, 44
Stat. 568. That act provided for a public right of freedom of interstate and foreign air
navigation "in the navigable airspace." The 1926 act has since been repealed but the
statutory declaration of national sovereignty in navigable airspace is embodied in 49
U.S.C. § 1508 (1970). See also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-62 (1946).
Apart from defining proprietary interests in airspace, legislatures have also sought
to define private interests in water: "In recent years both California and Texas have
by statute redefined the property acquirable in water so as to subordinate all appropria-
tions to the subsequently arising needs of municipalities in the state." Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 53 (1964), citing TEX. Civ. STAT. art. 7472 (1954), and
CAL. WATER CODE § 1460 (1956).
That legislative definitions of property have generally related to less well-defined
property concepts, such as water and airspace rights is not unexpected. As one com-
mentator has noted: "Such legislation ... would seem to be most likely to receive favorable
judicial treatment in connection with injuries to peripheral interests not yet fully
crystallized as 'property' by judicial decisions or by long-standing legislation." Van Alstyne,
Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The Scope of Legislative Power, 19
STAN. L. REV. 727, 759 (1967) [hereinafter cited as VAN ALSTYNE].
9. See statutes and cases cited in notes 6-8 supra.
10. See GOVERNOR'S PROPERTY RIGHTS STUDY COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT No. 1, TAKINGS,
DUE PROCESS AND THE POLICE PowERs: AN ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO LAND
USE REGULATIONS IN FLORIDA (Fla. 1975) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT No. 1]; GOVER-
NOR'S PROPERTY RIGHTS STUDY COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT No. 2, COMPENSABLE REGULATIONS:
POLICY ISSUES AND OPTIONS (Fla. 1975 [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT No. 2]. STAFF RE-
1976]
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In response to these concerns, the policy of legislative reticence
must be abandoned; the legislature must take an active role in
statutorily defining what constitutes a taking by land use regulation.
This conclusion is based upon two premises. First, the existing
doctrinal basis for distinguishing between a land use regulation that
constitutes a taking and one that imposes constitutionally permissible
restraints does not operate satisfactorily. Moreover, there is little hope
for more definitive judicial guidance. Second, given the failure of
the courts to provide such guidance, it is apparent that only the legis-
lature, the branch of government best situated to confront the multi-
faceted interests inherent in the taking issue, can adequately mold
these interests into a uniform policy.
As to the first premise, that judicial decision making has been
unsatisfactory, it is sufficient to summarize the judicial experience.11
There is presently no single theory or guideline employed by the
courts in deciding whether a particular land use regulation constitutes
a taking. Although new theories are propounded from time to time,13
such concepts add to, but do not supplant, older theories. The existence
of multiple theoretical bases has led to judicial juggling of rationales
so that in a particular fact situation the validity of a regulation may
chiefly be dependent upon which rationale the court applies. Such
"theory shopping" is apparent from decisions arriving at opposite
results under substantially similar factual circumstances.1 4
Lack of a unified theory or approach yields legal and policy uncer-
tainty. Without this certainty, legislative bodies cannot pinpoint the
outer limits of their authority with any degree of precision. Similarly,
landowners are forced into litigation in order to determine whether a
particular regulation is valid. Landowners are additionally deprived of
a predictable system whereby the legally permissible parameters of
future land uses may be charted and development rationally planned.
It is not surprising, though, that the legislature has deferred to
long standing judicial judgment on the taking issue. In 1922, the Su-
PORT No. 2 is summarized in Rhodes, Property Rights: Yours, Mine, Ours . 2 FLA. EN-
VIRONMENTAL & URBAN IssuEs, No. 6, at 3-5, 15-16 (1975).
11. Dissatisfaction with judicial decision making relative to the taking clause has
been expressed by numerous scholars. See, e.g., Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74
YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for
Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1970); Michelman, Property, Utility
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARv. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
12. See note 11 supra.
13. Id.
14. See Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme
Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 63,
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preme Court decided Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.1 5 The Court's
opinion, authored by Justice Holmes, developed a new test for de-
termining when land use regulation spawns a taking: "The general
rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.' ' 16 At a
time when land use regulations were nascent 7 it may have been
appropriate for the Court to develop an amorphous test that could
be refined as the courts became more experienced with the problem
and as the arsenal of land use mechanisms became identifiable. Yet
by the 1960's, when land use regulations had reached third generation
status, the courts were still struggling with the problem of developing
an unambiguous test. The experience of nearly half a century had
not stimulated the courts to develop an objective standard. The situa-
tion is reflected in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,18 the Supreme
Court's latest pronouncement on the taking issue and a case having
precedential value exceeded only by Pennsylvania Coal. In Goldblatt,
the Court clearly confessed that a judicial theory had not evolved:
"There is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and
taking begins."' 9 Thus, in 40 years the Court had succeeded in con-
cisely refining its standard from "goes too far" to "no set formula."
Since Goldblatt, there have been no significant decisions attempting
to explain the method for identifying a taking.
Obviously, then, the judiciary has not adequately confronted the
issue. In all fairness, however, the problem is difficult and admits of
no simple solution; moreover, any realistic approach to the issue must
provide flexibility. Yet the essential conclusion remains: Judicial de-
cisions have not successfully provided predictable and comprehensible
standards for discerning valid from invalid land use regulations.
Once it is recognized that judicial resolution of the taking dilemma
does not appear imminent, the question becomes: what other options
are available? The alternatives are few. The possibility of constitution-
al amendment is not feasible for two reasons. First, amendment of the
state constitution would not affect the federal constitution. More im-
portantly, the amendment process is too cumbersome to allow for
appropriate revision of the standard. Nor does there appear room for
15. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
16. Id. at 415.
17. When Pennsylvania Coal was decided, the United States Supreme Court had not
yet determined the validity of zoning, much less more sophisticated land use regulation
measures. The validity of zoning was sustained by the Supreme Court 4 years later.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
18. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
19. Id. at 594.
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simplification of the issue by the executive branch. No provision in
the Florida constitution countenances such power. If the executive is
to play any role, it must be to execute legislative direction. The only
practical avenue of assisting the judiciary, therefore, is through legis-
lative enactment.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE POWER TO DEFINE A TAKING
Assuming legislative disposition to define a taking, is such action
constitutionally permissible? There is no direct legal precedent, since
neither Congress nor any state legislature has attempted to do so.
Moreover, the scholars who have suggested statutory standards for
determining when a taking occurs have in general been more con-
cerned with pinpointing deficiencies in existing standards than with
formulating a unified rationale for replacing the multiple theories.20
The seminal question of legislative power has for the most part been
ignored or cursorily addressed. For example, in The Taking Issue,21
perhaps the best known work on the subject, the authors' analysis is
limited in essence to the statement that "courts have commonly de-
ferred to reasonable legislative attempts to define more precisely such
difficult standards as the line between taking and regulation.."22
Addressing the same issue, one commentator cites three Supreme
Court decisions to support the proposition that legislative resolution
of the taking issue is permissible. 2 But these cited cases appear in-
apposite. In the first, South Carolina v. Katzenbach,24 the Court upheld
a portion of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as a valid exercise of con-
gressional responsibilities under the fifteenth amendment. Significant-
ly, that amendment expressly authorizes Congress "to enforce . . . by
appropriate legislation ' '2 5 the constitutional prohibition against racial
discrimination in voting. The decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan,2 6
the second cited case, similarly upheld a portion of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 as a proper exercise of power granted to Congress under
the enforcement section of the fourteenth amendment. 27 The significant
point of these decisions is that the legislative enactments were generated
by express grants of constitutional authority. The taking and due
20. See note 11 supra.
21. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973) [hereinafter
cited as BOSSELMAN].
22. Id. at 266.
23. VAN ALSTYNE 729 n.12.
24. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
26. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
[Vol. 4:1
LEGISLATURE & TAKING ISSUE
process clauses do not contain such grants of authority; to the con-
trary, they actually limit governmental power.2" Hence, no meaningful
comparison can be made between congressional authority under the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments and state legislative power under
the fourteenth amendment. The third cited case is Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States,29 sustaining the validity of Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. That act was passed by Congress pursuant
to the constitutional authority given Congress to regulate commerce.30
Without doubt the commerce clause is a grant of legislative authority
and is not comparable to the taking clause since, as noted previously,
the fifth and fourteenth amendments contain no grants of state legis-
lative power.
To summarize, the question of legislative authority to define what
constitutes a taking has not been examined closely. The remaining
portion of this article explores that issue.
The Florida Legislature, unlike Congress,31 is constitutionally en-
dowed with plenary legislative power.3 2 This power may be limited
in two ways. First, legislative power is diminished when a constitution-
al provision explicitly or implicitly withholds a particular power.3 3
Second, legislative authority may be preempted if the constitution
vests such power exclusively with another branch of government.3 4
These limitations may appear in either the federal or state constitu-
tion.3 5 It is therefore appropriate to consider whether either constitu-
tion has limited the otherwise plenary legislative power of the Florida
Legislature.
A. The Federal Constitution
The fifth amendment's prohibition against the taking of property
28. "By the Fifth Amendment, [due process] was introduced into the Constitution
of the United States as a limitation upon the powers of the national government, and
by the Fourteenth, as a guaranty against any encroachment upon an acknowledged
right of citizenship by the legislatures of the States." Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124
(1876). See also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
29. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
30. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
31. Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 86 U.S. 666, 676 (1873); Legal Tender
Cases, 79 U.S. 457 (1870).
32. FLA. CONSr. art. III, § 1; State ex rel. Cunningham v. Davis, 166 So. 289 (Fla.
1936).
33. Merrell v. City of St. Petersburg, 109 So. 315 (Fla. 1926); Pursley v. City of Ft.
Myers 100 So. 366 (FlI. 1924).
34. See, e.g., FLA. CONsT. art. IV, § 9, vesting legislative authority with the Game
and Fresh Water Fish Commission.
35. Cf. Harlow v. Ryland, 78 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Ark. 1948), af'd, 172 F.2d 784 (8th
Cir. 1949).
1976]
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for public use without just compensation is made binding on the states
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 36 which pro-
vides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or pro-
perty, without due process of law. ''s7 As will be shown, no provision
of the fifth or fourteenth amendments appears to withhold from the
state legislative authority to statutorily define a taking.
Despite contrary precedent,3 8 the fifth amendment is often con-
sidered self-executing, requiring judicial enforcement without the
necessity of prior legislative action.39 Yet such construction does not a
priori preclude legislative implementation of the amendment. No
federal court, confronted with the taking issue, has ever held that legis-
lative definition of a taking is impermissible. Indeed, such a posture
would conflict with instances in which the Supreme Court has
recognized that legislative bodies are free to define other key phrases
of the taking clause such as private property,"0 just compensation,'4 1
and public use.42 For instance, the Court in Sauer v. City of New
York 43 recognized legislative power to determine what is compensable
property for federal constitutional purposes:
[E]ach State has ... fixed and limited, by legislation or judicial de-
cision, the rights of abutting [property] owners in accordance with
its own view of the law and public policy. . . . [T]his court has
neither the right nor the duty to reconcile these conflicting de-
cisions nor to reduce the law of the various States to a uniform rule
which it shall announce and impose. 44
36. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897); BOSSELMAN 115.
37. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
38. Cf. Westmoreland Chem. & Color Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 144 A. 407 (Pa.
1928); Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 354 P.2d 105 (Utah 1960). Both cases
construe state constitutional provisions similar to the fifth amendment's taking clause.
39. Dillon v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Ore. 1964), rev'd on other grounds,
346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966), provides the most explicit
recognition that the fifth amendment is self-executing. However, the federal courts
have repeatedly relied upon this principle by holding that the guarantee of compensation
for a taking immediately applies whenever the government appropriates property. A
private cause of action arises whether or not Congress has directed that compensation
or damages be paid. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48-49 (1960); United
States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 464-65 (1903); Sioux Tribe of Indians of Lower Brule
Reservation v. United States, 315 F.2d 378, 379 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 825
(1963). State constitutions have also been held to be self-executing. Bacich v. Board of
Control, 144 P.2d 818 (Cal. 1944); Renninger v. State, 213 P.2d 911 (Idaho 1950);
Schmutte v. State, 22 N.W.2d 691 (Neb. 1946).
40. See, e.g., Sauer v. City of New York, 206 U.S. 536 (1907).
41. See, e.g., Roberts v. New York City, 295 U.S. 264 (1935).
42. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
43. 206 U.S. 536 (1907).
44. Id. at 548.
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If the analogy to state legislative determination of the nature of pro-
perty has a weakness, it is that property concepts traditionally are de-
veloped by both the legislative and judicial branches,4" whereas the
definition of a taking is generally considered a judicial function. 46
But this traditional perspective should not be of major concern.
Federal as well as state courts have historically viewed the determina-
tion of just compensation as a judicial question.47 Yet on several occa-
sions the Supreme Court has recognized that legislative bodies do in
fact possess authority to define that term.48 A prime example is Roberts
v. New York City,49 where the Court without dissent upheld a New
York statute defining "just compensation" in eminent domain pro-
ceedings. Similarly, federal court decisions conclusively establish the
right of the legislature to say what is a public use. 50 For instance, the
Supreme Court, insisting on a high degree of judicial deference to
legislative determinations of public policy, has written that: "The role
of the judiciary in determining whether [eminent domain] is being
exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one." 51 This
judicial recognition of the legislative power to define "just compensa-
tion," "public use," and "private property," is strong authority for
concluding that the legislature is not precluded from enacting "taking"
guidelines.
The previous discussion alludes to the balance between judicial
and legislative powers. A fundamental concept of democratic govern-
ment is the separation of powers doctrine,52 which exists by implica-
tion in the federal constitution. 53 In concise, though perhaps dogmatic
form, the doctrine identifies three distinct functions that should be
exercised by three separate departments of government, each equal and
45. See Sauer v. City of New York, 206 U.S. 536 (1907). "[Ejach State has ... fixed
and limited, by legislation or judicial decision, the rights of abutting owners in ac-
cordance with its own view of the law and public policy." Id. at 548 (emphasis added).
46. See generally STAFF REPORT No. 1.
47. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co. v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 378 (Ct. Cl. 1954),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 863 (1955); Dore v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 239 (Ct. Cl. 1951); Ca-
hill v. Cedar County, 367 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Iowa 1973); United States v. 60,000
Square Feet of Land and Eight-Story Hotel Thereon, Known as Oakland Hotel, 53 F. Supp.
767 (N.D. Cal. 1943); State Plant Bd. v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1959); M.S. Alper &
Son, Inc. v. Director of Pub. Works, 200 A.2d 583 (R.I. 1964).
48. See, e.g., McGovern v. City of New York, 229 U.S. 363 (1913).
49. 295 U.S. 264 (1935).
50. Hoffman v. Stevens, 177 F. Supp. 898 (M.D. Pa. 1959); United States v. 277.97
Acres of Land, 112 F. Supp. 159 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
51. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
52. See generally Forkosch, The Separation of Powers, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 529 (1969).
53. The implication arises from the clauses in articles I, II, and III of the Constitu-
tion vesting different powers in each branch of the federal government.
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mutually independent.5 4 Under the separation of powers doctrine,
a function belonging solely to one branch of government cannot be
exercised by another branch.55
It is a judicial function "to say what the law is." 58 Not since Marbury
v. Madison57 has there been doubt that the Supreme Court is the final
arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution."' But this of itself does not
prohibit legislative efforts to give meaning to constitutional provisions.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that determinations of
"public use" and "just compensation" are judicial functions; nonethe-
less, the Court has recognized legislative power to define and implement
these constitutional provisions. 9 What is actually meant is that the
Court, or the judiciary, is the final arbiter, the ultimate interpreter of
the Constitution. Such ultimate authority does not preempt initial
legislative efforts to statutorily effectuate the taking clause; it merely
requires that any legislative definition must eventually stand up to
scrutiny under standards set by the courts.
Thus, numerous cases suggest that the federal constitution does
not withhold a state legislature's authority to define a taking. It is also
apparent that the constitutional principle of separation of powers does
not reserve such power solely to the judiciary.
B. The Florida Constitution
Article X, section 6 of the Florida constitution provides: "No
private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with
full compensation therefor paid to each owner or secured by deposit
in the registry of the court and available to the owner. '60 This pro-
vision is self-executing."' But, as pointed out in the previous discussion
54. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933).
55. Id.
56. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch,
327 U.S. 546, 551-52 (1946). The Supreme Court of Florida has also recognized this
legislative power. Daniels v. State Road Dep't, 170 So. 2d 846, 853 (Fla. 1964); Spafford
v. Brevard County, 110 So. 451, 458 (Fla. 1926).
60. The title of article X, § 6 is "Eminent domain." At first glance this may appear
to indicate that governmental takings occurring through land use regulation would not
be within the provision's ambit. However, article X, § 12(h) provides that: "Titles and
subtitles shall not be used in construction."
61. No case has been found expressly recognizing this fact; however, the wealth of
cases in Florida acknowledging the limiting effect of article X, § 6 on the police power
leave no doubt as to its self-executing nature. See, e.g., Mailman Dev. Corp. v. City of
Hollywood, 286 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1975);
Elliott v. Hernando County, 281 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Dade County
v. General Waterworks Corp., 267 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1972). See STAFF REPORT No. 1.
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of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, this circumstance does not pre-
clude legislative definition of a taking.62 Precedent for such action is
reflected in the legislature's implementation of the constitutional pro-
hibition against searches and seizures, another self-executing constitu-
tional prohibition.63
Directly on point are instances in which the Florida Supreme
Court has confirmed the legislature's authority to determine what is
public use, 64 private property,6 5 and just compensation. 66 The principle
enunciated in the cases is that these declarations of policy by the legis-
lature are entitled to presumptive validity, and will not be disturbed
unless clearly not "in accord with the judicial view of the matter."67
It can, therefore, be concluded that the power to define a taking has
neither been denied the legislature by the Florida constitution, nor
has it been exclusively delegated to the courts.
To recapitulate, the Florida Legislature has plenary legislative
power, including the power to define constitutional provisions, unless
negated by particular constitutional provision or reserved to another
branch of government. Neither federal nor state case law indicates the
existence of either limitation on the legislature's power. Any legisla-
tive scheme, however, will ultimately be subject to review by the
judiciary. The question of central concern, therefore, is not whether
the legislature may implement a "taking" definition-it may-but
rather, whether the courts will accept and defer to a statutory program.
IV. JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF A LEGISLATIVE DEFINITION
By necessity, the following discussion is limited to a highly
theoretical, perhaps circumstantial inquiry. But this limitation does not
lessen the value of the analysis; indeed, the theoretical search persuasive-
ly indicates that the judicial response would be a willing acceptance
of the legislative effort.
United States and Florida Supreme Court decisions reflect judicial
receptiveness to legislative determination of what constitutes public
use, just compensation, and property as elements of the taking clause.
62. No Florida court has expressly ruled out the possibility of a legislative definition.
Cf. Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1960) (recognizing that subject matter of a
self-executing provision may also be the subject of legislative enactment).
63. FLA. STAT. § 933.02 (1975).
64. Spafford v. Brevard County, 110 So. 451 (Fla. 1926).
65. North Dade Water Co. v. Florida State Turnpike Auth., 114 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
66. Daniels v. State Road Dep't, 170 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1964); Glessner v. Duval
County, 203 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
67. Daniels v. State Road Dep't, 170 So. 2d 846, 852-53 (Fla. 1964); Spafford v.
Brevard County, 110 So. 451, 458 (Fla. 1926).
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For example, the judicial policy in Florida is to uphold statutory defini-
tion of a public use unless "the use is clearly and manifestly of a pri-
vate character." 68 The Supreme Court, according great weight to the
legislative determination of public purpose, has asserted that the
courts have only a very limited role to play in that decision. 69 An earlier
decision cast palpable doubt upon even this limited scope of review:
"We think that it is the function of Congress to decide what type of
taking is for a public use and that the agency authorized to do the
taking may do so to the full extent of its statutory authority. ' '70
Concerning the element of just compensation, the Florida Supreme
Court has not only invited legislative declaration, but has indicated
that such legislative policy will be afforded substantial deference:
[T]he legislature may declare its policy with respect to the compensa-
tion that should be made in taking private property for public use;
... these declarations, while not conclusive or binding, are persuasive
and will be upheld unless clearly contrary to the judicial view of
the matter.71
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Roberts v. New York City,72 upholding
a New York eminent domain statute, stated that a statutory just com-
pensation mechanism will be upheld where "fair upon its face. 73
The likelihood of judicial acceptance of a legislative definition of
a taking is also increased by the venerable rule of construction that
where a provision is ambiguous, great weight should be accorded to
the meaning given it by the legislature.74 Beyond this general rule
there exist several other rationales for judicial deference to legislative
interpretation of constitutional terms. As recently stated by Chief
Justice Burger: "[W]hen we face a complex problem with many hard
questions and few easy answers we do well to pay careful attention
to how the other branches of Government have addressed the same
problem." 75 That the judiciary has found few answers to the question
of when a land use regulation becomes a taking is apparent from the
Court's pronouncement in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead76 that a
formula to answer the question has not yet been established.
68. Spafford v. Brevard County, 110 So. 451, 458 (Fla. 1926).
69. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
70. United States ex. rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 551-52 (1946).
71. Daniels v. State Road Dep't, 170 So. 2d 846, 853 (Fla. 1964).
72. 295 U.S. 264 (1935).
73. Id. at 277. See also Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
74. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); CBS, Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
75. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103 (1973).
76. 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
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The Supreme Court has further indicated that the weight given a
congressional interpretation of the Constitution must be determined,
inter alia, by the attitude of the judiciary regarding the question in-
volved."7 The judicial attitude toward the taking clause seems to suggest
that a legislative construction would have substantial force. First, the
generality of expression found in the existing doctrines on the subject
readily invites specific legislative formulation. Second, inability of
the judiciary to adopt a unified rationale78 indicates a strong likeli-
hood that legislation defining a taking would be respected, if not wel-
comed. If the judiciary cannot develop a suitable doctrinal basis to
resolve the issue, and the executive branch lacks the constitutional
authority to do so, it is incumbent upon the legislature to take the
initiative. Third, the present line of cases lacks practical guidelines. 79
The decisions do not provide predictability or guide the legislature in
determining the scope of the police powers; they confuse landowners
and encourage litigation. It is therefore apparent that any legislative
scheme, even a codification of the existing multiple taking theories,
would reduce litigation and enhance predictability. Additionally, the
Supreme Court has indicated that the provision of a usable standard is
a prime determinant in whether a legislative determination will be
upheld.80 For these reasons, it is likely that a reasonable and practical
statutory scheme would be afforded great weight if challenged in the
courts.
An additional principle affecting the weight given by the courts
to legislative construction of the Constitution warrants discussion. The
77. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 170 (1926).
78. 1973 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ANNUAL REP. 129.
79. See text accompanying notes 11-19 supra.
80. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). In CBS the Court
rejected the contention that a broadcaster's ban on all paid public issue announcements,
upheld by the Federal Communications Commission, was an unconstitutional deprivation
of freedom of speech. Of particular importance to the decision was the extensive system
of regulation established by Congress and the FCC to accommodate the competing
demands placed upon the broadcast media:
Balancing the various First Amendment interests involved in the broadcast
media and determining what best serves the public's right to be informed is a
task of a great delicacy and difficulty. The process must necessarily be undertaken
within the framework of the regulatory scheme that has evolved over the course
of the past half century. For, during that time, Congress and its chosen regulatory
agency have established a delicately balanced system of regulation intended to
serve the interests of all concerned.
id. at 102. The Court did not believe that this carefully constructed regulatory frame-
work should be straitjacketed by the first amendment. "Congress, and the Commission
as its agent, must remain in a posture of flexibility to chart a workable 'middle
course' in its quest to preserve a balance between the essential public accountability
and the desired private control of the media." Id. at 120.
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Supreme Court has recognized that the very nature of the question
under discussion is itself an important factor."' The question at hand
is where to fix the acceptable boundary between the police power and
the taking clause. In United States v. Cress, 2 the Supreme Court
reasoned that "it is the character of the invasion . . . that determines
the question whether it is a taking."8 3 As Professor Van Alstyne cor-
rectly suggests, "The 'character of the invasion' test invites consideration
of all relevant competing policy aspects of the particular case, rather
than confining judicial attention to the narrower issue of whether a
property interest has been invaded or destroyed.' ' s Yet, if the decision
is based upon policy, the decision of what constitutes a taking is more
properly a legislative rather than a judicial function. "The responsibili-
ty of [the Supreme] Court," Justice Black has explained, 5 ". . . is to
construe and enforce the Constitution and laws of the land as they are
and not to legislate social policy on the basis of our own personal in-
clinations. ' ' 6 The policy laden character of the taking issue itself en-
courages legislative resolution.
Thus, in conclusion, it appears that there is legislative power to
enact a boundary between the police power and an impermissible
taking of property, although this statutory determination will of course
be subject to judicial review. The likelihood of judicial acceptance of
such a legislative definition appears promising since the issue requires
a policy judgment, and since courts have failed to adopt a satisfactory
formula.
V. CRITERIA FOR A LEGISLATIVE APPROACH
As previously discussed, the court decisions have not articulated
a set formula for determining whether a land use regulation is a valid
or invalid exercise of the police power.8 7 The Florida Supreme Court,
in Town of Bay Harbor Islands v. Schlapik,88 and a number of
prominent commentators89 have characterized one process used in de-
81. Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283 (1901).
82. 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
83. Id. at 328. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946).
84. VAN ALSTYNE 727, 761.
85. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
86. Id. at 447.
87. See notes 11-19 and accompanying text supra.
88. 57 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1952). "The exercise of the police power from its very
nature, clashes with full enjoyment of property by its owner, and it is only because
the welfare of the whole people so far outweighs the importance of the individual
that this interference with constitutional guaranties can be justified." Id. at 857.
89. Binder, Taking Versus Reasonable Regulation: A Reappraisal in Light of Re-
gional Planning and Wetlands, 25 U. FLA. L. Rav. 1, 9-10 (1972); Kratovil & Harrison,
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termining the validity of a property regulation as a balancing test-a
weighing of the public benefit against the private harm. When the
private detriment resulting from the challenged restriction substantial-
ly outweighs the potential community benefit to be realized by its en-
forcement, the courts will strike down the regulation as unreasonable
or arbitraryY0 Although the unique set of facts involved in each case
will determine the particular factors the court will place on the scales,
a number of guidelines have achieved credibility through frequent
employment by the courts. The legislature, in formulating its own
policy on the taking issue, may wish to consider the following criteria
that have been considered significant by the courts.
A. Diminution in Value
The Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal Company v.
Mahon,91 articulated a relationship between the diminution in value
of the private individual's property and the validity of the police
power regulation generating the diminution. The Court espoused the
rule that a regulation that causes too great a devaluation of property
is invalid.92 This doctrine seemed to confine the question of when
compensation must be paid to the owner strictly to a consideration of
the value of the regulated property. Yet in Goldblatt v. Hempstead,93
the Court declared in dicta that "[a]lIthough a comparison of values
before and after [the regulation] is relevant, it is by no means con-
clusive." 94 This is undoubtedly the most important consideration for
Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 596, 609-10 (1954); VAN
ALSTYNE 31 (VAN ALSTYNE refers to the test as one of "suitability" rather than "balancing,"
although the components are the same); Comment, 38 WrAsu. L. REV. 607, 612-13 (1963).
Most of these commentators cite the balancing test as one of the few stated formulas
and theories the courts use to approach this question. The balancing test is probably
the most important and most often used test, even though not always explicitly stated.
90. STAFF REPORT No. 1, at 6-7.
91. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
92. Id. at 413. The Court stated that:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and
must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have
its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for considera-
tion in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches
a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.
Id.
93. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
94. Id. at 594. The Court, in stating that the comparison of values is not conclusive,
cited Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), where diminution in value from
$800,000 to $60,000 was upheld.
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the landowner, but regardless of its importance it will be only one of
the elements the court will consider.95
B. Comprehensive Plan
Since Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.96 in 1926, the Supreme
Court has recognized the restriction of property to certain uses in
accordance with a comprehensive plan as a valid exercise of the police
power. In fact, the critical factor in Euclid was the comprehensive na-
ture of the plan.97
The courts of Florida and other states have recognized the ad-
vantages flowing from an overall development scheme as compared
to piecemeal efforts to tackle the problems of our complex, ever
growing society; the result has been reluctance to invalidate regula-
tions that would affect the ordered growth and development of an
area.9 8 More importantly, as government has become more sophisticated
in its approach to the problem through the use of regional and state-
wide systems of planning, the courts have continued to follow Euclid
by giving great deference to legislative attempts to deal with the
problem through comprehensive land use planning.99
C. Objective or Purpose of Regulation
The legislature can only act so as to promote the general health,
safety, morals or welfare of the public.10 The objective or purpose for
95. City of Miami Beach v. First Trust Co., 45 So. 2d 681, 688 (Fla. 1949); Polk
Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Lakeland, 143 So. 2d 917, 919 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
For a survey of the role diminution in value has actually played in decisions relating
to the validity of land use regulations, see BOSSELMAN 208-11.
96. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
97. See BINDEa, supra note 89, at 14.
98. The Florida Supreme Court, in holding land use restrictions valid or invalid, has
considered, among other things, the effect upon the city's zoning plan. City of Miami
Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148, 152 (Fla. 1953); City of Miami Beach v. First Trust
Co., 45 So. 2d 681, 688 (Fla. 1949); City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 3
So. 2d 364, 366 (Fla. 1941). See also Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
370 P.2d 342 (Cal.), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962); Haar, In Accordance with a
Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1154 (1955).
99. See, e.g., Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation and
Dev. Comm., 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (Ct. App. 1970). Florida recently has enacted legislation
adopting a regional planning approach with respect to developments of regional impact,
FLA. STAT. §§ 380.012-.12 (1975), and water resource regulation, FLA. STAT. §§ 373.012-.6161
(1975). Neither of these statutes has faced a constitutional challenge. In Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), the United States Supreme Court may have
given an added boost to comprehensive state-wide land use regulations. Id. at 5 n.3 and
accompanying text. See 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 787, 795-97 (1974). See generally BOSSELMAN
192-94, 214-29.
100. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); City of Miami
Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla. 1953).
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which the legislation is designed may tip the balance in favor of its
validity or invalidity. Where private benefits or objectives are advanced
instead of the promotion of general community interests, the regulation
will be struck down. Examples include those zoning regulations em-
ployed to restrict or eliminate business competition;' to enrich the
government through its regulating powers; 10 2 and to exclude various
ethnic, social, or economic groups.103 Emergency situations are often
given great weight towards upholding the land use regulation.' In
contrast, regulations which have the objective of promoting aesthetics
have been given less deference by the courts. 05
D. Suitability of Property for Uses Permitted by Regulation
A landowner has no right to the highest and best use of his proper-
ty,'06 but a regulation may not restrict the property so that it deprives
the landowner of the only use for which it is reasonably adapted,'10 7 or
101. Wyatt v. City of Pensacola, 196 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1967); See
generally VAN ALSTYNE 19-20 nn.96-99.
102. In City of Miami v. Silver, 257 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972), and
Board of Comm'rs of State Institutions v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 108 So. 2d
74 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1958), the zoning ordinances appeared to have been adopted
for the purpose of depressing land values preliminary to eminent domain proceedings.
See generally VAN ALSrYNE 23-26.
103. VAN ALSTYNE 22 nn.105-07. But see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1
(1974); 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 787, 795-97 (1974).
104. YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969) (troop occupation and resulting
damage to buildings during 1964 Panama Canal Zone riots not considered a taking);
Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 70 (1853) (city had to dynamite a building to serve as a fire-
break). See also Russell v. New York, 2 Denio 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845). That war efforts
can be lumped under this classification as being given great deference by the courts, see
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
105. Aesthetic values have had a varied history of recognition in court decisions.
Only a few state courts have upheld the validity of zoning regulations based solely upon
aesthetic considerations. Oregon City v. Hartke, 400 P.2d 255 (Ore. 1965); Cromwell v.
Ferrier, 225 N.E.2d 749 (N.Y. 1967). Aesthetic values are often considered with other factors
when the welfare of the community is involved. City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland
Co., 3 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1941); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub.
Works, 193 N.E. 799 (Mass. 1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936). Certain prohibi-
tions, such as those pertaining to outdoor advertising and junk yards have been upheld on
highway safety and economic considerations. Desert Outdoor Advertising v. County of
San Bernardino, 63 Cal. Rptr. 543 (Ct. App. 1967); City of Shreveport v. Brock, 89 So.
2d 156 (La. 1965). Also, certain zoning restrictions used to preserve the character of his-
toric districts have been upheld. See, e.g., City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 389
P.2d 13 (N.M. 1964). See generally Steinbach, Aesthetic Zoning: Property Values and the
Judicial Decision Process, 35 Mo. L. REV. 176 (1970).
106. Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 1 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1941).
107. City of Clearwater v. College Properties, Inc., 239 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1970); STAFF REPORT No. 1, at 17.
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restrict it to a use to which it is unsuitable.'08 Unsuitability seems to
connote a substantial unlikelihood of development of the property
within the stated restrictions because of economic considerations or
the use being made of surrounding properties.10 9
E. Availability of Less Restrictive Alternatives
Where less restrictive alternatives exist, courts tend to weigh this
in favor of striking the regulation. This particular concept has been
interpreted by one commentator to mean that the use restriction in
question must be indispensable to the general plan.110 The Supreme
Court, ruling in Nectow v. City of Cambridge", that a zoning ordinance
was invalid as applied, emphasized the lack of indispensability." 2 On
the other hand, where it appears that surrounding properties could be
affected" 3 or the general zoning plan would be jeopardized by failure
to uphold the use restriction,14 courts have generally upheld the regu-
lation.
F. Trends in the Land Development Pattern of the Community
This element requires an overview of the general character of the
community, 15 and a determination as to whether that character has
been altered because of natural changes 1 6 or artificial development. 117
If there have been no basic shifts in the development pattern of the
108. Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 1 So. 2d 642, 646 (Fla. 1941); STAFF REPORT No.
1, at 17.
109. In Forde, the court stated that restricting the property in question to single
family residences was unsuitable because of the high cost of reclamation and the heavy
expense of taxes. In Burritt v. Harris, 172 So. 2d 820, 823 (Fla. 1965), the court held
the land unsuitable for classification more restrictive than industrial "A." At the time
of the suit it was zoned for residential use. In so deciding the court considered: (1) the
predominant zoning in the area (industrial "B," which allowed heavier industrial de-
velopment than "A"); (2) the fact that the land was near an airport which created a
high noise level; (3) the close proximity of a paper and pulp plant which spewed
noxious odors. See also VAN ALSTYNE 33-34.
110. VAN ALSTYNE 732.
111. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
112. Id. at 188.
113. Blank v. Town of Lake Clarke Shores, 161 So. 2d 683, 685 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1964).
114. See note 98 supra.
115. See, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 3 So. 2d 364, 364-66 (Fla.
1941); Blank v. Town of Lake Clarke Shores, 161 So. 2d 683, 686 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1964) (residential character was paramount attribute of the community).
116. See, e.g., Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 1 So. 2d 642, 646 (Fla. 1941), where
the court looked at the effect of hurricane damage to the property in question.
117. See, e.g., Burritt v. Harris, 172 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1965) and Tollius v. City of
Miami, 96 So. 2d 122, 125-26 (Fla. 1957), where the court examined the area of the
city near the property, paying particular notice to traffic and highway changes.
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locality since the adoption of the regulation, courts generally will not
force change on the area."" The premise here is that existing regula-
tions promote community stability. But if the character of the com-
munity has changed, the judiciary has been more disposed to invalidate
an ordinance as applied to the subject property.
Here again the court analyzes the surrounding property, with
particular attention given to the restrictions placed on neighborhood
land. The court is not likely to uphold restrictions that create a
"veritable island," where the subject property is surrounded by land
wholly of a different classification or of different characteristics. 119
Conversely, the court will not uphold an ordinance that reflects
spot zoning. 12 The emphasis once again is on the preservation of
regularity in the community's system of regulation:
[T]o zone a single piece of property that has theretofore been a part
of a comprehensive zoning plan without any other reasons than to
place it in an adjacent zoning district, is a form of zoning erosion that
if permitted would completely emasculate the orderly processes of
zoning as we know them.' 2 '
G. Nuisance
Numerous legislative efforts outlaw certain activities as unreason-
able interferences with the enjoyment of surrounding property or the
welfare of the community. 22 These "noxious uses," as they are called,
are justifiably abated when sufficiently onerous to the community, even
though private loss results to the owner. 22 Assuming a regulation falls
118. "It has long been settled in Florida that zoning regulations which promote
the integrity of a neighborhood and preserve its residential character are related to the
general welfare of the community and are valid exercises of the legislative power." City
of Miami v. Zorovich, 195 So. 2d 31, 37 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967); accord, Blank v.
Town of Lake Clarke Shores, 161 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Gautier v.
Town of Jupiter Island, 142 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
119. Tollius v. City of Miami, 96 So. 2d 122, 125 (Fla. 1957). The court considered
this "island" as one of the characteristics that required a finding of invalidity. "Aside from
the characteristics of the land, and the land around it, apparent from the sketch, there
was abundant testimony that the property in litigation no longer retained the features
which at the time of passage of the zoning ordinance justified classifying it as a site
usable only for one purpose." Id.
120. City of Miami v. Ross, 76 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1954). See also STAFF REPORT No. 1, at
14-15.
121. Cole v. Oka, 131 So. 2d 757, 758-59 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
122. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Pierce Oil Corp.
v. City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919); Northwestern Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 239
U.S. 486 (1916); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. City of Little
Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878).
123. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915). Even though the value of
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within this narrow classification, there is strong precedent for uphold-
ing the regulation. 124
H. Economic and Environmental Consequences to the Community
The Supreme Court in Miller v. Schoene-25 recognized that in cer-
tain circumstances the economic welfare of the community can out-
weigh and prevail over private economic interests. In Miller the Court
upheld a Virginia statute mandating the destruction of all red cedar
trees infected by cedar rust disease that were within a 2-mile radius
of an apple orchard. The legislative judgment that protection of the
apple orchards was of greater value than the owner's rights in the
ornamental cedars was instrumental to the decision. 2 8
The Florida Supreme Court, in Corneal v. State Plant Board,12 1
considered a similar case, where citrus trees were destroyed as part of
a program to control and contain the citrus disease "spreading decline."
In Corneal both infected trees and noninfected trees were destroyed.
The Court held that compensation must be made at least for the loss
of profits sustained by the owner whose healthy trees were destroyed.128
Since the 1908 decision in Hudson County Water Co. v. Mc-
the subject property diminished from $800,000 to $60,000, the regulation was found a
justifiable exercise of the police power.
124. The rationale in the following cases was that the activity prohibited could
reasonably be regarded as incompatible with surrounding community use: Pierce Oil
Corp. v. City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919) (storage of gasoline within 300 feet of any
dwelling); Northwestern Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916) (emission
of smoke from industrial furnaces); Haddacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (manu-
facture of bricks within specified area of municipality); Reinman v. City of Little Rock,
237 U.S. 171 (1915) (operation of livery stables in certain parts of the city); Fertilizing
Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878) (maintenance of fertilizer works in village).
BOSsELMAN at 199 compares the application of the nuisance criteria in two fairly
recent cases: Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 370 P.2d 342 (Cal.),
appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962) (regulation prohibiting mining of rock and gravel
in agricultural and residential districts sustained); Lyon Sand & Gravel Co. v. Township
of Oakland, 190 N.W.2d 354 (Mich. 1971) (regulation prohibiting gravel mining without
a permit, limiting the depth of excavation, and restricting the manner of operation in a
relatively rural area struck down).
125. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
126. Id. at 279. The Court also appeared to consider the fact that no less drastic
alternative was available.
127. 95 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1957).
128. Id. at 6-7. The court stated that absolute destruction is a very extreme exercise
of the police power and is justified only within the limits of actual necessity. Id. at 4.
Since the healthy trees offered no immediate menace to the trees in a neighboring grove,
their destruction was not justifiable. Id. at 6. The court in dictum did say that "the
Plant Board would have been justified in destroying the diseased trees without compensa-
tion to the owner, if this had been found to be a practicable method of containment of
the disease." Id. at 5. That the disease posed a serious threat to the citrus industry
was the deciding fact for upholding a program of destruction of infected trees. Id.
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Carter,129 the United States Supreme Court has recognized the states'
right to protect their natural resources even though interference with
private use of those resources results.2 0 Although the Court has not
been involved significantly in environmental questions, 12' state courts
have experienced significant activity in the 1970's. s2 A Wisconsin de-
cision, Just v. Marinette County,2 8 has probably been the most
significant proenvironment decision in recent years. In Just, the
court upheld as a valid exercise of the police power a shoreline zoning
ordinance restricting the filling of certain swamp areas.3 4 Recently,
the Florida Supreme Court, in City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama,
Inc.,35 has ruled that the doctrine of customary rights gives the public
enforceable recreational rights in the dry sand portions of the state's
beaches.2 6
All of the elements discussed above have been recognized in court
decisions; however, the particular weight or emphasis to be given any
one of them is generally not clear. Certainly the facts of each case
shape the court's reasoning, as well as the often-repeated maxim that
the court will not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature
where decisions about policy are involved.1 7 But the courts are con-
stantly called upon to evaluate whether a regulation or its particular
application is a valid exercise of the police power, and they must
accomplish this task by assuming a legislative posture of balancing the
129. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
130. "[I]t is recognized that the State as quasi-sovereign and representative of the
interests of the public has a standing in court to protect the atmosphere, the water
and the forests within its territory, irrespective of the assent or dissent of the private
owners of the land most immediately concerned." Id. at 355. See also Cities Service Gas
Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 185-86 (1950) (acknowledging the power to
prevent waste of natural resources); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm., 286
U.S. 210, 233 (1932) (the state has a right to reasonably regulate the use of oil and
gas supplies in order to prevent unnecessary loss, destruction, or waste).
131. The Court has in fact gone far to limit its review of such questions. In Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), the petitioner, "a membership corporation with
,a special interest in the conservation and the sound maintenance of the national parks,' "
id. at 730, lacked standing under the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 701 et. seq., (1970), to challenge the construction of a recreation area in a national
forest as violative of federal law.
132. For a comprehensive review of this area of the law, see BOSSELMAN 141-82, 212-35.
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ing the filling or dredging of Boca Ciega Bay, thereby depriving the owner of any
valuable use of his property, to be a taking without just compensation in the absence of
proof of overriding public necessity. Id. at 379-80.
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1976]
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
public and private interests involved in land use regulation. Perhaps
it is time for the legislature itself to confront the issue, to statutorily
balance the competing interests, and provide the courts with a firm
policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
If uniform, comprehensible, and predictable compensation policies
are to be established to delimit the desirable exercise of regulatory
powers, the task lies with the legislature. The complex mix of com-
peting economic, social and legal concerns woven throughout the
taking issue cannot be assessed and molded into an integrated policy
by the judiciary. Moreover, the courts should not be expected to resolve
the private-public property rights imbroglio. Courts must wait for
litigation to be initiated, are bound by the distinct facts of an in-
dividual case, and are constrained to rule only on the particular situa-
tion in question. These factors, coupled with the doctrine of stare
decisis, effectively reduce the potential for judicial resolution of the
taking conundrum.
The issue requires review by a body able to weigh all interests,
consider numerous options, and develop and initiate innovative
policies. This is the unique role of a state legislature. Moreover, any
policy should include a fiscal program or funding source, enactment
of which is the sole prerogative of the legislative branch.
Although the judiciary is the final arbiter or ultimate interpreter
of constitutional provisions, the Florida Legislature may enact legis-
lation effectuating the taking clause. The power to take such action
is not reserved exclusively to the courts. Moreover, given the paucity
of judicial guidance relative to the taking issue, and the policy-laden
nature of the question, the judiciary may be disposed to accept and
validate a practical and functional statutory program.
Necessary to any legislative approach to the taking issue is a de-
termination of what should be considered a taking, as well as a sensi-
tivity to what may be proscribed as a taking. The legislature therefore
should provide a number of policy options. For example, it could de-
termine that as a matter of policy, not constitutional mandate, property
owners whose land value is diminished to a certain level by regulations
should be compensated in a particular manner. Or a program could
be enacted to afford property owners appropriate compensation once
particular regulations are judicially invalidated.
The exact nature of compensation provides a fertile area for legis-
lative analysis. Compensation could be monetary or could include
a mix of development density bonuses or transfer of development rights
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to other areas. An exchange of land may also be considered appropriate
compensation in certain circumstances. Any program would of course
be reviewable by the courts as to the minimal constitutional adequacy
of compensation in an individual case.
A number of additional compensation options are available to the
legislature. Many of these approaches, as well as potential sources of
revenue for funding a compensation program, have been outlined by
the Governor's Property Rights Study Commission. 38
In sum, resolution of the taking issue must be accomplished by the
legislature. The inclination of the legislature to assume this responsibili-
ty and the disposition of the judiciary to accept a reasonable and
practical legislative program will in large part determine the fate of
growth management in Florida.
138. See note 10 supra.
